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Accounts of the relation between these allegedly distinct elements differ markedly.
Strawson characterizes Hume's naturalist-explanatory strategy as constituting a refuge from the inevitably sceptical outcome of epistemological reflection.
2 Michael Williams sees a tendency to portray the relation as one that involves us oscillating between perspectives on our beliefs, sometimes a rational-epistemic perspective, other times an explanatory-naturalist one. 3 Paul
Russell suggests that the relation presents readers with an apparent 'riddle' since Hume's epistemic aims are not only hard to square with his explanatory approach but are in tension with it. The Treatise in this respect being 'not just Janus-faced but ... broken-backed'. 4 Nevertheless explaining our beliefs, Hume tells us, can illuminate the principles of human nature and inform our understanding of the sciences, particularly the 'science of man' which he locates as foundational. 5 So realizing the explanatory ambition promises to give more than a narrow understanding of how beliefs qua internal mental states arise. The interpersonal dimension of our epistemic practices, the social regulation of belief, the first-person and intersubjective phenomenology of belief-states and their role in our cognitive, affective and practical life are topics amongst others that come into view by seeking to explain our ideas and beliefs in Hume's sense. So identifying the explananda is not a simple task and thus neither is specifying the
explanantia.
There is an important difference between the naturalist-explanatory elements and those passages where Hume discusses the epistemic status of belief. But the difference need not be portrayed as one in which the elements are characterized as antagonistic or even independent, encouraging an oscillation of the sort Williams describes. A view which reads Hume's account of belief as incorporating both explanatory and normative aspects has already been proposed by previous influential interpretations. 6 My approach here is consistent with some of these insofar as it seeks to show that an account of belief formation is relevant for how we should understand the epistemic status of belief. What distinguishes the view I propose here is that the explanatory and epistemological approaches are conceptually related; that there is a form of belief explanation that provides an agent with entitlement to believe. Other interpretations have suggested that natural, non-epistemic (in particular psychological) properties determine the epistemic status of belief. According to such interpretations a complete explanation of how beliefs are formed invokes non-epistemic properties that subsequently and independently fix epistemic status: such properties have an essential role in reliably producing true beliefs for example. There are different versions of this view of Hume (which I will come onto in the next section) but what is common to them is the assumption that the only or at least the principal way that a belief can be justified, according to Hume's naturalistic account, is explained by the role of non-epistemic properties. Providing a vindicatory explanation likewise shows how a belief can be justified; but it does so without grounding a belief's epistemic status on the workings of non-epistemic purely naturalistic properties, a needlessly reductive account that cannot make sense of the basic subject-matter of Hume's explanatory project.
Hume tells us very little indeed about what exactly he means by explain and explanation and so it is not straightforward what the project of explaining our ideas and beliefs amounts to or how anyone might evaluate its success. One way to fill-in the blanks here might be to connect Hume's obvious enthusiasm for explanation with his equally obvious enthusiasm for science. As a 'Newton of the mind', for instance, Hume might be thought of as modelling explanations of the existence and behavior of mental phenomena on the explanatory and predictive success of physics. Hume notes how the moral philosopher 'fixes the principles of his science' in an analogous way to the natural philosopher, the one concerning historical events and practices for instance, the other 'plants, minerals, and other external objects' (EHU 8. the possibility that the experience is identical both to a person of 'advanc'd knowledge' and to those without such understanding. It is hard to take seriously the idea that the background knowledge to which Hume appeals in this context is relevant only in distinguishing cognitive activity subsequent to experience, as if the empirical input is identical in the two cases yet the output, the inference, is different depending on whether or not a person has this standing knowledge. It is, I think, much more plausible to supppose that the meaning of the relevant experience must be different in each case such that the input itself is changed by the possession and influence of background knowledge.
Hume describes a case of a person who, after 'sufficient instances', is able to form a robust belief in the occurrence of an anticipated event where this belief is grounded in a form of understanding (A 12, SBN 651). The point here is not just about how belief arises from the observation of one event, which is immediately associated with another, because of the 'frequent conjunction of objects'. It also describes the case of a person who is capable of higherorder observation in the sense just referred to: understanding has a role in anticipating experience in the context of a familiar series of previously conjoined events, and also in cases of unfamiliar or partial ('imperfect') experience perhaps constituting a single case. Once the relevant form of understanding is in place it structures perceptual and cognitive possibilities such that one is able to form beliefs on the basis of 'one experiment'. Such an experiment is isolated in one sense but, for a mature agent, it occurs against the background of a preestablished understanding and is thus interconnected with a person's wider experience that grounds belief formation.
In cases of belief arising from the operation of a higher-order observational capacity, a person needs background understanding that cooperates with a relevant experience. Causal belief, for example, is not the product of Association or Education since the relevant experiential input is slender, perhaps singular. Neither could it be the product of Reason, understood in one of Hume's senses, since the belief is not generated by demonstration. But rationality more broadly construed is at least partly responsible for the relevant belief since it arises in virtue of pre-formed understanding. So parsing the salient roles of reason and rationality is not straightforward, particularly because Hume uses reason in a number of contrasting ways, yet such a broader construal is consistent with Hume's use.
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At Treatise Book 1 Sec. V in which Hume is discussing the origin and composition of ideas he makes use of a distinction in an attempt to improve on the cognitive taxonomy established by Descartes, Locke and Berkeley. 12 The distinction is there to provide a more developed account of how, on the one hand, our ideas are related and, on the other, how we 11 The differing ways that 'reasons' is used by Hume is discussed by Falkenstein, "Naturalism", A. 'Look, the cat is on the mat. So, given S's perceptual capacities and S's presence near the cat, no wonder he believes that the cat is on the mat.'
Nonempirical belief:
'7 + 5 = 12. The calculating rule leaves room for no other answer. So, no wonder S, who understands the calculating rule which leaves us no room for any other answer, believes that 7 + 5 = 12'. In the present context distinguishing the fact that p, on the one hand, from there being no room to deny that p on the other, is not a distinction between two explanans: one that invokes a worldly state of affairs independent of S and one a psychological state such that S is inescapably driven to possess a particular belief. When a vindicative explanation of S's belief that p invokes the fact that p, the referent is not just some independent fact or property which furnishes S with grounds for the belief that p via some form of non-normative causal relation. That, for Wiggins at least, is not the right species of causation. Vindicatory explanations, for instance, are a species of causal explanation but not in the sense of characterizing our beliefs as arising in virtue of some brute contact with an independent reality.
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In the mathematical case the causal explanation of belief does not just invoke the fact that 7+5=12 as explanans. What informs the explanation includes the proper understanding and application of calculating rules, a subject's cognitive capacities, her opportunities and access to relevant information for example.
32
A vindicatory explanation involves the process of elucidating what leads to the state of mind such that there is nothing else to think but that p.
The kind of explanation being proposed here is also a form of justification in so far as the person is shown, through the explanation, to be vindicated in holding the belief.
According to Hume reason (understood narrowly in the sense outlined in §1) cannot be the source of an everyday belief that a moving ball will cause a stationary ball to move when they collide. Rather such a belief can only arise on the basis of experience, although 'experience' is used by Hume in different ways. Experience sometimes means a discrete occurent episode of, say, looking at a ball. In such cases Hume is interested in the nature of the relevant perceptual content and its implications as the source of ideas and beliefs. But very often Hume employs 'experience' to refer to a diachronic process that reveals or shows us something about the origin of ideas and beliefs as they emerge in the course of 'common life': their part in our developing lives as human beings. 33 Experience does not just refer to the alleged sensory origin of ideas. Hume refers to how experience teaches us about those beliefforming processes that constitute part of our epistemic agency.
34
Part of what is included under Hume's key idea that a belief arises on the basis of experience is how this basis cultivates a felt expectation that a stationary ball, for instance, will be caused to move when struck by another ball. Hume explains in the first Enquiry that 'no man, having seen only one body move after being impelled by another, could infer, that every other body will move after a like impulse' (EHU 5.1, SBN 43 Whether or not Hume's analysis of causal inference is defensible is, of course, the subject of an enormous amount of interpretation and commentary. I will not try to rehearse Hume's account or attempt any assessment of whether Hume's overall view here is the right one, or the right one for Hume to hold on his own terms. What I want to highlight is the difference that distinguishes the habituated experience from naïve experience for the purposes of clarifying what explanatory possibilities that difference implicates. We are now in a position to appreciate more fully the force of Hume's remarks about the background role of 'advanc'd knowledge' discussed in §1. For some beliefs at least, the explanation of their coming into existence cannot be adduced other than by invoking a constitutive background of person-level development or formation. A belief of that kind cannot be fully explained in a way that omits the previous experience of an agent where that does not just refer to the passive reception of serial sensory input. This past experience is the formative background without which some of our core beliefs would be not only inexplicable, but nonexistent. Without the anticipative structure of belief cultivated through experience of sufficient instances, we would not have Humean beliefs at all and so the explanatory ambition would become incoherent.
Suppose S is watching a marble rolling toward another stationary one on the table. If
Hume is right S cannot help believing that the stationary marble will move because of the background experiential context in light of which S now perceives the first one moving. This context, one partially shaped by understanding, provides S with a different experience and way of thinking than the one S would have had if perception of the present rolling marble was not augmented by previous experience. It is true enough that, with effort, S can speculate about the occurrence of events other than that of the stationary marble moving when the rolling marble collides with it. But in the condition that S is now in as a developed agent, it is no longer possible for S to believe anything other than that the marble will move.
The phrase 'it is no longer possible' needs some qualification. Hume does allow that we can conceive that a stationary ball will not move, a conception that picks out a possible state of affairs albeit in a merely 'metaphysical sense' as he puts it (A 11, SBN 650-651). Hume insists that we can 'conceive any effect to follow from any cause, and indeed any event to follow upon another' (A 11, SBN 650-651). But we cannot believe that any effect to follow from any cause, we cannot believe that the stationary ball will not move when struck. Causal beliefs of this sort involve an immediate felt expectation sewn into occurrent perception once habit and custom are operating; on seeing the ball move toward to the stationary ball we immediately come to believe that the latter will move. The fact that we can conceive of it not moving does nothing to alter the inevitability of our believing that it will move. On reflection, or 'abstractly considered, and independent of experience' (A 15, SBN 652), we might entertain the possibility that the ball will remain still. But what we abstractly consider cannot undermine what we in fact believe. We are free, through the use of the fancy, to conceive of whatever we like (other than what is contradictory) but we are not free to believe whatever we like. Consider again Wiggins's 'nothing else to think' formula to explain belief now applied to the billiard ball example:
'Look, this ball is moving toward that stationary one. So, given the way that S's experience is now informed by understanding, no wonder S believes that the stationary ball will move.'
We should allow that S can conceive, in Hume's technical sense, of something other than that the stationary ball will move in the way anticipated. As he puts it in the Enquiry 'may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow...? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction?' . But, if we follow Hume, we cannot allow that there is something for S to believe other than that the ball will move in the way anticipated. Since both conception and belief are species of thinking, a 'nothing else to think' formulation is too broad in scope; when considering an episode or state of affairs there are (almost always) a number of things that one can think or conceive. So we ought to restrict the formulation to: 'There is nothing else to believe'. And put like this the formulation amounts to saying that S's belief is inevitable thus, on the face of it at least, characterizing it as a 'natural Harman says, can be explained in another way, one which does not invoke a controversial normative property (wrongness) as part of the explanans. The alternative explanation refers only to non-moral properties and a set of enculturated response dispositions that a subject learns during the process of ordinary upbringing. This explanation would destabilize the initial characterization of the origin of belief which, ex hypothesi, is that the causal history of the belief at some point mentions the presence of the relevant moral property. The destabilizing explanation shows the property to be explanatorily redundant and that the relevant belief is produced by mechanisms quite different from a sensitivity to such a property as supposed truthmaker.
Consider another case. Suppose that early humans, ignorant of the truth, formed beliefs about some kind of supernatural agency as explanation of natural events. Later, once cognizant of the truth, humans came to understand that the previous belief forming processes were not constitutively sensitive to the truth. Rather, what explained the belief's existence was, say, the pervasive anxiety to which the belief in supernatural agency was a reaction. 40 Whatever it is that fixes or guides the belief in this case it is non-epistemic since the aim of belief here is not truth but feelings of (say) reassurance. The causal history of belief reveals that the relevant origin is truth-independent and so non-epistemic, thus at least jeopardizing (destabilizing) the entitlement that S would have for believing that p. Externalism is usually characterized as a widening of what can count as sufficient for justification; being justified need not be a product of discovering internally accessible warrant but, at least in some cases, by having one's beliefs produced in a reliably truth-guided way.
Externalism is not a rejection of internalism as such since if a person is aware that the history of a relevant belief includes the fact that it is based on epistemically dubious grounds, then that is an internally accessible reason for this person to at least withhold endorsement of if not reject that belief. 44 Likewise it is perfectly consistent with a weak form of externalism that a person can locate and endorse internally accessible content that justifies their belief. Nevertheless, externalism allows for S to be justified in believing that p in a way that does not require S to be aware of and to endorse the justificans. On the face of it the relevant externalism must be of a fairly strong form excluding the role of content given internally, content that in the best case simply fails to provide justification and, in the worst, is immediately destabilizing. But the connection between the apparent failure of internalism and the role of reason needs careful consideration. In particular we should avoid the assumption that embracing externalism requires privileging non-rational, non-epistemic elements in belief formation, perhaps psychological properties of the sort identified by Kemp Smith and Loeb.
The way I have portrayed vindicatory explanation suggests that the failure of reason to illuminate the grounds of belief from the inside, as it were, does not imply that scepticism can only be avoided by exploiting the non-rational, so-called natural elements of belief formation.
According to my proposal sufficient instances of experience provide a form of 'cultivated rationality', a term used in a different but related context by McDowell. 45 Exercising cultivated rationality can result in a person being justified in a way that does not require explicit awareness and endorsement of the justificans yet is not the product of purely non-rational processes. Recall ( §1) the emphasis that Hume puts on a form of generalized understanding that informs the inferences available to a person of 'advanc'd knowledge'. Characterizing the belief that a stationary ball will move as an achievement of cultivated rationality is a way of acknowledging the role of understanding in this context. Warrant for a belief need not issue, then, either solely from the reflective intellect or from mindless mechanisms connecting an agent to the world. A vindicatory explanation of belief lays out the context of belief formation in such a way that gives the inevitability of belief a rational articulation in the sense elucidated above.
Conclusion
I have tried to sketch a way of understanding Hume's account of belief as consistent with the scheme of vindicatory explanation. A result is that Hume's promised explanation of our beliefs can be characterized not as somehow opposed to his critical epistemological project. To be sure the differing emphases in Hume's account of belief are important; but portraying the 'explanatory' aspect and the 'normative' aspect as if they cannot be fused misses an important contribution that Hume is making to our understanding of the nature of belief. Once the Humean project of explaining belief is not assumed to be a descriptive, non-normative exercise, the account of belief formation can itself contribute to our understanding of how belief can be justified. Vindicatory explanation of belief shows how coming to understand the context of a person's experiential and doxastic development provides an explanation of belief which, in so doing, confers an epistemic status on the believer. attending to the processes through which S is 'accustomed' and habituated in Hume's sense such that what is available for S to think and to believe is changed by the training and exposure that 'sufficient instances' provide. In the scenario imagined by Hume and focused on in this paper, S looks at a ball rolling towards another motionless ball and forms the belief that this latter ball will move when struck by the first. Given S's context, understood in the way outlined here, S cannot believe anything else: S inevitably believes that the ball will move. What a vindicatory explanation of that belief provides is a way to characterize the inevitability, not in a psychologistic way but in a way that already provides a potential form of justification.
